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Naval spending has always involved large amounts of resources, research and
technology, money, and the attention of civilian and military leadership. In 1794 the
Congress authorized $800,000 (1794 dollars) to construct six frigates. Today, an attack
submarine costs more than $2 billion, an aircraft carrier more than $5 billion, and its air
wing $5 billion more. These ships are the only current American clients for nuclear power
plants. The Navy must balance these large capital expenditures with other procurements
and maintain an industrial base capable of producing these unique warships. The Navy
currently manages these complex interplays via the Integrated Warfare Architecture
Assessment Planning Process (IWARS). Force Structure, an IWARS component, views a
25-year horizon at the platform level using the Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated
Authority Model (a spreadsheet that estimates the financial impact of any complete future
plan). This thesis presents an integer-linear program, the Capital Investment Planning Aid
(CIPA), that extends EPA/TOA with optimization. CIPA explores all alternatives while
considering budget restrictions, industrial base requirements and restrictions, and force
level requirements. CIPA is tested with a 25-year planning horizon with eight mission
areas, 19 ship classes, five aircraft types, five production facilities, and three categories of
money. A current base case and several excursions demonstrate CIPA can be used to
address exigent issues optimally.
VI
DISCLAIMER
The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made,
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without
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Naval procurement has always involved large amounts of resources, research and
technology, money, and the attention of civilian and military leadership. In 1794,
President Washington personally persuaded the Congress to authorize a budget of
$800,000 (1794 dollars) to construct six frigates. Today, a single attack submarine costs
more than $2 billion, an aircraft carrier more than $5 billion, and its air wing $5 billion
more. These ships are the only current American clients for nuclear power plants. The
Navy must balance these large capital expenditures with other procurements and maintain
an industrial base capable of producing these unique warships.
The Navy manages procurement via its Integrated Warfare Architecture
Assessment Planning Process (IWARS). Force Structure, an IWARS component, views a
25-year horizon at the platform level. One of their primary objectives is to quantify, in
dollar and capability terms, the effect of Ship Conversion Navy (SCN) and Aircraft
Procurement Navy (APN) programs in the Navy. To meet this objective they use the
Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority Model (EPA/TOA), a spreadsheet
that estimates the financial impact of any complete future plan. It is up to the analyst to
manually specify all the proposed details for any given scenario over the entire planning
horizon — a daunting task — to ensure that force level requirements are met and critical
industrial facilities have adequate work to maintain Navy unique construction skills.
Consider that the IWARS Force Structure analysts develop alternate yearly force
structures over a 25-year horizon for over 100 platforms, with each alternative accounting
for numerous platform retirements and the 14 major procurement programs in process or
under consideration.
This thesis presents an integer-linear program, the Capital Investment Planning
Aid (CIPA), designed to enhance the EPA/TOA model by using optimization to replace
much of the manual work and thereby help analysts evaluate alternate force structures.
CIPA recommends the best yearly force structure procurement plan based on industrial
constraints, fiscal constraints, force level requirements, and force mix requirements. It
xvn
illuminates key decisions such as purchase dates and rates, the inability to meet
procurement requirements due to financial constraints, and resource conflicts.
Additionally, CIPA produces results that are consistent with the most recent force
structure recommendations that are presented in the Fiscal Years Defense Plan and allows
budget violations that can be repaid by other savings in the future.
CIPA has been tested with a 25-year planning horizon with eight mission areas,
19 ship classes, five aircraft types, five production facilities, and three categories of
money. To demonstrate CIPA, a baseline case provides a benchmark for later excursions.
The baseline reveals that attack Submarine force levels cannot be maintained at the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) specified level of 50. This turns out to be a
consequence of an assumption that limits production of SSN774 class submarines to two
submarines a year — an assumption made to reflect initial joint synchronous production at
Electric Boat and at Newport News shipyards. CIPA recommends small over-
expenditures in Fiscal Years 13, 17, 18, and 19. Fortunately, these over-expenditures
occur far enough in the future that they can be dealt with and balanced with lower
spending in earlier and subsequent years. In another excursion, submarine production is
increased to four per year, attack mission requirements are thereby met, the total amount
expended over the entire planning horizon is greater than for the baseline, and CIPA
recommends over-expenditures in Fiscal Years 16 and 18, but the total is less for this
excursion than for the baseline. The total amount expended over the entire planning
horizon is greater for this excursion due to the restriction to procure more SSN774 class
submarines.
A critical insight here is that EPA/TOA will only evaluate a scenario completely
specified in every detail: EPA/TOA is a purely descriptive model. By contrast, CIPA
accepts the rules governing scenarios — the constraints — and recommends the best
alternative among multitudes. CIPA is a prescriptive model. CIPA also recommends
solutions so attractive that they warrant small violations of constraints — these solutions
are frequently insightful and persuasive. Although CIPA can be restricted to echo a
completely fixed plan, and thus mimic EPA/TOA, it is the optimization that searches for
xvin
and reports the best plan among many that is the distinguishing advantage of CIPA over
EPA/TOA.
The CIPA proof prototype offers unprecedented opportunity for force structure
planning. CIPA is the only known navy model that integrates APN and SCN
procurements with fiscal, industrial, and mission requirements to render the best integrated
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We will study the Navy's capital planning system, which is only part of a
complicated Department of Defense budget planning process. How did this process get so
complex?
American defense budgeting began during the Revolution with proposed
requisitions for fielding men and armaments, hand-written by the few well-known general
officers who were preparing to personally lead these military operations. These requests
were for "what I need." This requirements-based process persevered with some
embellishment until after World War II, when the Hoover Commission required in 1948
that budgets be defended in terms of function and activities, rather than just numbers of
men and amounts of materiel. The Defense Department and its staffs asked for "what we
need to be able to achieve these things, by these specific means." "In 1959, General
Maxwell Taylor suggested a 'mission-oriented' budget. . . Congress subsequently asked
that the budget for fiscal 1961 be based on 'functional categories.' The idea was to
replace intermediate military 'inputs' by strategic 'outputs' directly describing the policy's
intended effects... [Martin 1988]." Subsequently, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamarra introduced the 5 -year budget programs and a penchant for detailed decision-
support that still characterizes defense budgeting. Now, we start with strategy, express
this in terms of mission areas, and then eventually expand these into actual requirements
for personnel, materiel, and, in particular, major weapons systems.
Naval spending has always involved large amounts of resources, research and
technology, money, and attention of civilian and military leadership. In 1794, President
Washington asked the United States Congress to authorize construction of six frigates at
six different sites to help protect American merchant fleets from attacks by Algerian
pirates and harassment by British and French forces [Hagan 1978]. With a total budget
exceeding $800,000 (1794 dollars), congressional debate was intense, but construction
was ultimately approved on the condition that it be conducted exactly as proposed in six
different constituencies, thus affording political insulation. In fiscal year 1999 dollars, the
frigates would cost $2.6 billion [Vargo 1999] The USS Constitution, shown in Figure 1,
employed revolutionary technology, used more than 1,500 trees felled from Maine to
Georgia and was armed with cannons cast in Rhode Island [USS CONSTITUTION 1999].
At the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, Nelson's flagship was 46 years old, navies of today
usually reckon half that as the maximum life of a warship. In 1863, President Lincoln
formed the National Academy of Sciences to draw on the best academic and engineering
talent in America to advise the Navy which new revolutionary technologies to adopt for
the Civil War. Today, an attack submarine costs more than $2 billion, an aircraft carrier
more than $5 billion, and its air wing $5 billion more. These ships are the only current
American clients for nuclear power plants. The Navy must balance these large capital
expenditures with other procurement and maintain an industrial base capable of satisfying
its unique requirements. As we have learned in two World Wars, it is essential to
maintain — perhaps even by managing competition — domestic defense industries in
times of peace and industrial consolidation.
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Figure 1. The USS Constitution exhibited innovative naval architecture and the latest
aremanment technology (Figure from - [All Hands 1997]). Construction of the
Constitution was planned and approved at the highest levels of American government,
and required a nationwide mobilization of resources.
Navy budget analysts must continually respond quickly to scenarios arising from
emergent world events and domestic politics. Their advice must consider the complex
interplay between past decisions, politics, and fiscal realities. This thesis offers a new
optimization tool to assist Navy planners to quickly arrive at the best advice.
The Navy's current effort to better manage the complex interplay is the Integrated
Warfare Architecture Assessment and Planning Process (IWARS). IWARS promises to
reduce inconsistencies and redundancies the old system admitted when sponsors pushed
their own priorities without considering the overall requirements and capabilities of the
Navy. IWARS also promises to ensure the Navy can contribute to the nation's joint force
capabilities while addressing the complexity of Naval Warfare and the need to integrate
programs when allocating scarce resources [Chief of Naval Operations 1999]. Force
Structure, an IWARS component, views a 25-year horizon at the platform level (e.g.,
ships, submarines, aircraft) (see Figure 2). This thesis presents an integer-linear program,
the Capital Investment Planning Aid (CIPA), that augments the Extended Planning
Annex/Total Obligated Authority (EPA/TOA) model with optimization. CIPA explores
all alternatives while considering budget restrictions, industrial base requirements and
restrictions, and force level and mix requirements.
REDUCED SIGNATURES
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Figure 2. An artist's rendition of the Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21) (Figure from -
[Director, Surface Warfare 1999]). This next-generation surface combatant will replace
the aging Spruance (DD-963) class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class
frigates. The Navy plans to acquire 32 DD-21s at a rate of three ships per year beginning
in Fiscal Year 2004 [Chief of Naval Operations 1999]. The planned cost for the DD21
are 750 million (FY96$) for the fifth ship and operation and support cost that are 70
percent lower than those of the DDG51 ship class [DD21 Program Executive Office
1999]. This thesis presents an integer-linear program that augments existing tools for
exploring alternate yearly force structure plans at the platform (e.g., DD21) level. The
program recommends yearly procurement and retirement rates over a 25-year horizon for
24 platforms while considering inventory requirements, fiscal constraints, and industrial
constraints.
A. BACKGROUND
IWARS started in 1998 and is the responsibility of the Chief ofNaval
Operations Assessment Division (N81) [Chief ofNaval Operations 1999]. IWARS
consists of 12 integrated warfare architecture components. The primary IWARS
components are Power Projection, Sea Dominance, Air Dominance, Deterrence, and
Information Superiority/Sensors. The support IWARS components are Sustainment,
Infrastructure, Manpower/Personnel, Readiness, Training/Education, Technology, and
Force Structure. The IWARS objectives are to provide end-to-end capability analysis of
naval forces with a linkage between warfare and support components, measured
performance, sequencing and synchronization of capabilities, and sound operational
architectures. IWARS will provide detailed program planning inputs to the Chief of
Naval Operations Program Assessment Memorandum separately from the Planning
Programming and Budgeting System. These inputs will be persistent from year to year
and fiscally bounded. [Valentine 1999]
The focus of the Force Structure component is "on assisting Navy leadership in
best matching available resources with desired capabilities in the near, middle, and far
terms" [Chief of Naval Operations 1999]. More specifically, the Force Structure
component develops and analyzes alternate procurement and retirement plans for ships,
submarines and aircraft (see Figure 3) that meet fiscal constraints [Valentine 1999]. One
of their primary objectives is to quantify, in dollar and capability terms, the effect of Ship
Conversion Navy (SCN) and Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN) programs.
Figure 3. An artist's rendition of the Navy variant Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) (Figure
from - [Joint Strike Fighter Program 1999]). The Navy variant of the JSF, the next
generation strike aircraft, is being designed to compliment the F18 E/F [Joint Strike
Fighter Program 1999]. Expected delivery of the first operational aircraft is Fiscal Year
2008 for the Marine Corps and Fiscal Year 2010 for the Navy [Director, Air Warfare
1999]. This thesis presents an integer-linear program that augments existing force
structure planning tools. It allows analysts to do a more thorough job of exploring the
combined effects of procuring the next generation ships and aircraft for the Navy and
Marine Corps.
B. FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
The Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority (EPA/TOA) model is
the primary tool used by N81 to evaluate specific alternate force structures. Based on
inputs from the warfare IWARS components, resource sponsors, and numerous
documented requirements such as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Defense
Planning Guidance and Commanders in Chief operational plans, analysts perform manual
what-if scenarios using the EPA/TOA model. Analysts then compare scenario results to
determine the best structure that most closely matches projected budgets and meets force
size and capability requirements.
Systems Planning and Analysis, Incorporated maintains the EPA/TOA model for
N81. Systems Planning and Analysis [1998] states that the objectives of the EPA/TOA
model are:
1) To accurately estimate long-range Navy TOA requirements at the
appropriation level for a given yearly force structure.
2) Project aircraft and ship yearly force structure based on the current resource
allocation, long-range procurement plans, delivery schedules, retirement
schedules, expected service lives, attrition, and maintenance requirements.
The EPA/TOA model links sixty-two spreadsheets that calculate yearly Military
Personnel (MILPERS), Civilian Personnel (CIVPERS), Military Pay Navy (MPN),
Operation and Maintenance (OMN), Other Procurement Navy (OPN), Ship Conversion
Navy (SCN), Aircraft Procurement Navy (APN), Procurement of Ammunition
Navy/Marine Corps (PANMC), Weapon Procurement Navy (WPN), Research
Development Technology & Experimentation (RDT&E), Military Construction
(MILCON), Family Housing Navy (FHN), National Defense Sea-lift Fund (NDSF), and
































Figure 4. Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority (EPA/TOA) Model
Structure [Systems Planning and Analysis 1998]. This model is the primary tool used by
the IWARS Force Structure component for analysis. It consists of 62 spreadsheets that
are linked to estimate Total Obligated Authority. This thesis provides an integer linear
program to augment the EPA/TOA model with optimization.
The current Resource Allocation Display (RAD), a snapshot of the Fiscal Years
Defense Plan (FYDP) at a specific point in time, is the basis for near-term cost,
procurement, and retirement of weapons systems. The EPA/TOA model fixes TOA in the
near term based on the FYDP. For the middle-term and far-term the analyst inputs
procurements and retirements of weapons systems. The model calculates TOA based on
cost estimation relations for MILPERS, CIVPERS, MPN, OMN, OPN, SCN, APN,
PANMC, and WPN monies. The model uses cost analogies — the multiplication of a
historic data point by a scalar— to estimate cost for RDT&E, MILCON, FHN, NDSF,
and OTHER monies.
The force structure analysts are primarily concerned with the procurement and
retirement of ships, submarines and aircraft. Ships are procured with SCN money and
aircraft with APN money. Within EPA/TOA procurement of ships and aircraft directly
affect SCN and APN, and indirectly affect some of the other TOA monies through their
cost estimation relationship. A sample of the cost estimation relationship and analogies
within the EPA/TOA model for SCN, APN, and OMN in the middle term are presented in
Appendix A.
Using the EPA/TOA model for force structure analyses requires the analyst, for
each possible force structure, to answer the following questions:
1) Have all documented force requirements outlined in the Quadrennial Defense
Review, Defense Planning Guidance, Commanders-in-Chief operational plans
and other instructions been met?
2) Have all industrial constraints been considered? For example, is a carrier
always being built at Newport News and a submarine at Electric Boat? Has
production capacity been exceeded at any shipyard?
3) Will future procurements and retirements satisfy force size and force mix
requirements?
4) Will the proposed structure fall within the projected budget?
5) Have all spreadsheets been updated to reflect the proposed force structure?
The EPA/TOA model does an adequate job of estimating TOA for a specific force
structure if the analyst has correctly answered these questions [Systems Planning and
Analysis 1998]. The problem is that this is still essentially a manual process. For
instance, to change the procurement plan for the DDG5 1 class ship requires an analyst to
answer these questions and then synchronously make consistent changes to 3 different
spreadsheets. This is very cumbersome and error-prone considering that the IWARS
Force Structure analysts develop alternate yearly force structures over a 25-year horizon
for over 100 platforms. Each alternative accounts for numerous platform retirements and
the 14 major procurement programs in process or under consideration.
C. PURPOSE
This thesis presents an integer-linear program, the Capital Investment Planning
Aid (CIPA) that uses EPA/TOA data, but eliminates the necessity to manually prepare
complete scenarios, and generalizes the problem statement from EPA/TOA's "evaluate
this solution" to CIPA's "derive the best solution within these guidelines." CIPA
recommends a yearly force structure procurement plan based on industrial constraints (see
Figure 5), fiscal constraints, force level requirements, and force mix requirements. It
illuminates key decisions such as purchase dates and rates, the inability to meet
procurement requirements due to financial constraints, and resource conflicts.
Additionally, CIPA produces results that are consistent with the most recent force
structure recommendations that are presented in the FYDP and allows budget violations
that can be repaid by other savings in the future.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II begins with an overview of models identified by N81 for use in force
structure analysis and concludes with a literature review of military capital budgeting
models.
The CIPA model is presented in Chapter III. Model assumptions are presented
first and followed by the model formulation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
CIPA's elastic variables and penalties.
Implementation of and analysis with CIPA is described in Chapter IV. First
baseline data and model results are presented. Results from the baseline case suggest
several excursions that are examined.
Chapter V details conclusions and recommendations.
n*vism9gMzm9.com
Figure 5. Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier construction at Newport News
Shipbuilding (Figure from - [NAVISMAGAZINE 1999]), the sole shipyard in the United
States capable of building nuclear-powered carriers. Critical industrial base technologies
and skills such as those used to build carriers, submarines, and surface ships must be
maintained. No civilian or commercial counterparts to these products exist and foreign
sources cannot produce these ships for the Navy [Chief of Naval Operations 1999]. The
Navy must procure ships at rates that maintain this domestic industrial base. The integer-
linear program presented in this thesis schedules procurements so that minimum
production requirements are met and the maximum capabilities of the associated
shipyards are not exceeded.
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II. IWARS MODELS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. FORCE STRUCTURE IWARS MODELS
Including the EPA/TOA model, three models exist and one model is under
development for potential use in IWARS force structure analyses. Systems Planning and
Analysis, Incorporated maintains the Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority
(EPA/TOA) model, the model that is primarily used by N8 1 . The Naval Center for Cost
Analysis manages the other available models: the Navy's Visibility and Management of
Operation and Support Cost (VAMOSC) and the Operating and Support Cost Analysis
Model (OSCAM). These two models only estimate Operation and Support cost.
A model under development, Advanced Dynamic Evolutionary Process Tool
(ADEPT), is a simulation model [Decision Dynamics Incorporated 1999]. Decision
Dynamics advertises ADEPT as a "suite of five interrelated simulation models designed to
help people understand and manage a product's entire life cycle from design, through
production and operation." Once operational, ADEPT'S initial contributions to force
structure planning will most likely be in the form of Operation and Support cost and data
estimates based on the effective age of individual ships. ADEPT, through simulation, will
reportedly be able to model the effective age of a ship given its operating and maintenance
schedules. Another potential ADEPT contribution is reportedly in the scheduling of
procurements and retirements of ships and aircraft. Decision Dynamics claims ADEPT
can use optimization to suggest alternate courses of action. In the future, ADEPT may
have the ability to combine the effective age simulation with optimization and provide
retirement and procurement schedules, though we do not see the quantitative foundation
for doing so. This portion ofADEPT is not currently being funded by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and would reportedly require a minimum of one year to be
operational [White 1999].
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B. MILITARY CAPITAL BUDGETING OPTIMIZATION MODELS
Brown, Clemence, Tuefert, and Wood [1991] develop a large-scale capital
budgeting model, named PHOENIX, to aid Army helicopter force planners modernize a
fleet that was primarily composed of Vietnam era aircraft. Since PHOENIX, capital
budgeting models have been used by the Army to modernize its fleet of tactical wheeled
vehicles [Brown et al. 1991], and by the Air Force to create investment plans for the
research and development of space-based systems [Newman et al. 1999]. Newman et al.
provide an extensive literature review of both commercial and military capital budgeting
optimization models; here we only describe military models that are similar to CIPA.
PHOENIX plans four actions: procurement ofnew aircraft on new production
lines, changing existing production to incorporate necessary enhancements, applying
service life extension programs to existing aircraft, and retiring obsolete aircraft.
PHOENIX schedules these actions by trying to minimize Operation and Maintenance
costs while ensuring that sufficient numbers of aircraft exist to meet mission requirements,
that maximum average age restrictions for mission specific aircraft are not exceeded, that
production requirements and restrictions are met, and that budget expenditures are
acceptable. Given their projected budget, PHOENIX provided Army helicopter force
planners with valuable insight that suggested: downsizing of the helicopter fleet was
mandatory, mission area deficiencies were inevitable, and some existing helicopters were
less cost effective than projected. PHOENIX also suggested that in order to adopt the
most promising force structure alternatives, funding levels would need to be non-uniform
and careful violation of policy constraints would be required. The PHOENIX model was
credited with saving a new helicopter program that was on the brink of cancellation and
with changing the Army's approach to planning modernization. The Army used the same
approach employed in PHOENIX to plan the modernization of its tactical wheeled
vehicles. The foundation for CIPA is the PHOENIX model.
Newman, Brown, Dell, Giddings, and Rosenthal [1999] present another large-
scale military capital budgeting application in their technical report on the Air Force's
Space Command Optimizer of Utility Toolkit (SCOUT). Their report provides a
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description of SCOUT, model modifications, and computational experience. They
describe SCOUT as "a mixed integer linear program that selects a set of concepts, the
dates of inception and discontinuance of use, and the number of concept launches by type
and year which best satisfy the Air Force Space Command's operational tasking
requirements"[Newman et al. 1999]. SCOUT minimizes penalties associated with failure
to meet task performance requirements, violating budget constraints, and penalties
incurred from spending money that does not result in task performance gains. The
constraints in SCOUT can be categorized into four types: budget constraints, performance
requirements, precedence requirements and interdependency requirements. The budget
constraints account for yearly budget limitations and restrictions on cost over a five-year
time epoch. The precedence constraints ensure that primary systems are operational
before subordinate systems. SCOUT is another example of a successful large-scale
military capital budgeting model. A version of SCOUT was used by the Air Force Space
Command to select concepts in 1997 [Newman et al. 1999].
Since PHOENIX, capital budgeting models have been presented in a variety of
military applications. Donahue [1992] develops a multi-objective optimization model to
help Army Training and Doctrine Command select which candidates to include in the
Long Range Army Materiel Requirements Plan. The model objectives are to improve the
Army's warfighting capability while maintaining mission area balance. The model is
constrained by budget restrictions, congressionally mandated project requirements,
incremental funding requirements, and project relationships that can be mutually
exclusive, complementary, or subordinate.
Ihde [1995] develops the Anti-armor Resource Allocation Decision Aid
(ARADA) model to assist the Department of Defense in determining anti-armor weapon
procurement policy. ARADA seeks to maximize effectiveness across selected weapon
systems. Weapon system selection is restricted by constraints on the budget and
procurement. Gross [1996] creates a mixed integer program that expands on ARADA to
allow selection of weapon systems across diverse mission areas.
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Can* [1996] develops a mixed integer linear program to help the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization plan Theater Missile Defense system procurements. The model
minimizes total procurement costs while meeting budget restrictions, operational
requirements, scheduling restrictions, and weapon interdependency requirements.
Lastly, Loerch [1999] discusses how the Army uses optimization and cost
estimation in the current descendent of Phoenix to plan purchases of weapons and
equipment. Concave cost functions that arise as a consequence of learning effects are




A. MODEL OVERVIEW AND ASSUMPTIONS
CIPA is an integer-linear program that recommends a yearly force structure
procurement plan based on minimizing penalties for violating budget constraints,
production constraints, or inventory requirements. For a recommended plan, it illuminates
the required budget, purchase dates and quantities, production facility employment levels,
and force levels. Additionally, it isolates force level deficiencies associated with budget
mandated procurement levels, production that cannot keep pace with procurement
requirements, or failure to identify replacements for retired platforms.
Because CIPA is designed to extend EPA/TOA, every effort has been made to
mirror EPA/TOA. Major assumptions carried over from EPA/TOA include:
1) Procurement in the near term (FYOO to FY05) is fixed to follow the Fiscal
Years Defense Plan;
2) Procurement costs are incurred in the first year of production or earlier. Costs
are not spread out over the entire production period of a platform;
3) Operation and maintenance cost for a platform are incurred for the entire year
of delivery;
4) Aircraft are delivered two years after procurement; and
5) All monies are in Fiscal Year 1999 million (FY99$M) dollars.
One last assumption, specific to CIPA, is that Total Obligated Authority (TOA) is
completely constituted ofjust the categories of money represented in the model. For
example, when aircraft and ship procurements are modeled, TOA is the sum of SCN,





The model uses both binary and continuous decision variables to strike a balance
between realism and solvability. The number of ships procured in a given year is
relatively small, so these decisions are governed by binary variables. Aircraft
procurements are generally made in larger numbers so they are represented by continuous
variables. Inventory levels of operational ships and aircraft are represented by continuous
variables for similar reasons. Additional binary variables are used to specify non-convex,
piecewise linear cost functions used to approximate the EPA/TOA cost functions.
The model uses "elastic" [e.g., Brown, et al. 1997] constraints and a penalty
function. The elastic constraints admit solutions that would customarily be infeasible by
charging a penalty per unit violation of such constraints. Elastic constraints are denoted
[e.g., Brown, et al. 1997] by a dot over the relational operator (e.g., <, > ). For ease of




m mission area {combatant, carrier, fighter...}
s ship class {DDG, DD21, CVX,...}
sm subset of ship classes that perform mission m
For example Scarner = {CVX, CVN63, CVN65, CVN68}
p production facility {Bath, Ingals, News, Eboat, ...}
ps subset of facilities that produce ship class s
For example Pddg = {Bath, Ingals}
a aircraft type {JSFN, F18EF,...}
am subset of aircraft types that perform mission m
For example aflghter = {JSFN, F18EF, F18CD, F18AB, F14}
c category of money {SCN, OMN, APN...}
y,y Fiscal Year {FY06, FY07, ..., FY25}
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d delivery year {FY06, FY07,
.
..,FY25}
q quantity produced {0,1,2}
t number of ships {1,2,3,4}
cost increment { 1 ,2,3
}
Identifies segment of piecewise linear, non-convex cost functions.
index data and dependencies
constyrs Sp
number of years required to build a ship of class s at facility
p (produced my, delivered in d = y + constyrs Sp -1).
Data (Data units are shown in parentheses)
toapeny
,
toapen penalty per unit violation ofTOA in year^ (FY99SM per
FY99SM)








production capacities for facility/? in year
y
(FY99$M per worker)
penalty per unit violation of platforms required to perform
mission m, mreqm (FY99SM per platform)
SCN cost in year y not directly associated with each
procurement option includes money budgeted for Landing
Craft Air Cushion, Service Craft procurement, transfer cost
for ships procured, and post delivery cost for ships
delivered (FY99$M)
historical fraction of total SCN money required for ship
outfitting cost (scalar)
fixed category c money cost in year v for platforms not
considered in CIPA for procurement (FY99$M )
amount of SCN money expended in yeary if / units of ship




























historical fraction of total APN categories 1 thru 4 required
for categories 5 thru 7 (scalar)
increment /' procurement cost per aircraft of type a for
delivery in year d (FY99SM)
increment i fixed procurement cost (intercept) for delivery
in year d of aircraft type a (FY99$M)
increment /' upper and lower bound for the number of type
a aircraft procured for delivery in yearjy (aircraft)
OMN cost per ship in year v for class s ships below
breakPts (FY99$M per ship)
OMN cost per ship in year y for class s ships above
breakPts (FY99$M per ship)
OMN cost per aircraft of type a (FY99SM)
initial inventory of class s ships (ship)
break point for OMN cost calculations for ship class s
(ship)
maximum number of class s ships in inventory (ship)
initial inventory of type a aircraft (aircraft)
TOA budget band for year.y (FY99SM)
workers required at facilityp in year^ to build q ships
of class s to be delivered in year d (worker)
maximum and minimum production capacities for facilityp







number ships of class s that must be retired by the end of
year y (ship)
number aircraft of type a that must be retired by the end of
year y (aircraft)
initial inventory of platforms available to perform mission
m (platform)
number of platforms required to perform mission m
(platform)















one if q ships of class s are procured for delivery in year d
from facility p, and zero otherwise
one if aircraft a is procured in cost increment i for delivery
in year d, and zero otherwise
one ift ships of class s incur SCN money cost in year>',
and zero otherwise
one if the number of class s ships is greater than breakPts in
year y, and zero otherwise
number of type a aircraft to procure in cost increment / for
delivery in year d (aircraft)
number of class s ships to retire in yearly (ship)
number of type a aircraft to retire in year_y (aircraft)
amount of money c to budget for yearjy (FY99$M)






number of class 5 ships below breakPts in year v (ship)
number of class s ships above breakPts in year y (ship)
total number of type a aircraft operational in yearjy
(aircraft)
Formulation
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< toa y Vy (13)
c
Industrial Constraints
Z X Xworkers spydq *SPROCsdpq < pcap py Vp,y (14)
s d q
X Z Z workers sPydq *SPROC sdpq > pcappy Vp,y (15)
s d q
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Constraints (1) calculate the total amount of SCN money spent each year. For a specific
year, constraint (2) relates the binary decision to produce q ships with the binary
indication that / ships incur SCN cost in year jy. For example, a DDG produced at Ingals
for delivery in FY 1 1 must be budgeted for in FY07. A DDG produced at Bath for
delivery in FY1 1 must be budgeted for in FY06. Constraints (3) ensure that at most one
quantity of ship class s is budgeted for in year >>. Constraints (4) calculate the total APN
money spent in a given year. Constraints (5) and (6) constitute a piecewise linear, non-
convex approximation of aircraft procurement cost as a function of volume produced. For
a given year, constraint (7) calculates the total amount ofOMN money spent. Constraints
(8) through (11) ensure the OMN budget reflects the number of operational ships in a
given year based on procurements and retirements. Based on procurements, retirements,
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and initial inventory levels constraint (12) counts the number of operational aircraft of
type a in a given year. Constraints (13) ensure TOA either remains within a yearly budget
band or an appropriate penalty is charged. Constraints (14) suggest that scheduled work
be within the capabilities of each facility or a penalty is charged. Constraints (15) suggest
that a minimum amount of work be scheduled at each facility so that it remains open or a
penalty is charged. Constraints (16) schedule parallel, synchronous construction for
SSN774 class submarines; SSN774 construction is a joint effort between Newport News
Shipbuilding and Electric Boat. For a specific facility, constraints (17) ensure that at most
one quantity of ships is procured for delivery in a given year. For example, in FY06,
constraint (17) does not allow a procurement of three DDGs from Bath for delivery in
FY1 1 and another separate procurement of four DDGs from Bath for delivery in FY1 1
.
Constraints (18) and (19) ensure that enough ships and aircraft are retired each year to
meet cumulative retirement goals. For a specific year, constraint (20) calculates the
inventory of ships or aircraft available to perform a mission; constraint (21) suggests that
sufficient ships and aircraft should be available to satisfy mission requirements in a given
year or a penalty is charged.
Representation of piecewise linear, non-convex cost functions is an important
concept here. For illustrative purposes, the CIPA formulation exhibits two alternate
representations of such functions.
Constraints (4) refer to a slope and intercept for each linear component, and all
linear components appear here. Constraints (5-6) select at most one of these components
for each aircraft and year. The resulting function yields for any aircraft volume the
appropriate cost. Note that the components are not necessarily contiguous, and that it is
possible that some procurement volumes are not allowed. This renders the APROC
aircraft procurement variables semi-continuous over the range of volumes, and the domain
of the cost function of these variables is piecewise linear and non-convex.
Alternately, for a special case in which there are only two piecewise linear cost
components, separated by a single break-point, constraints (8) accumulate cost increments
for OMNSB ships below the breakpoint and for OMNSA ships above the breakpoint. In
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the concave case, there is economy of scale, and the above-breakpoint ships are less
expensive. Constraints (9-11) make sure that the number of below-breakpoint ships
reaches the breakpoint before any above-breakpoint ships are allowed.
C. ELASTIC VARIABLES AND PENALTIES
CIPA minimizes penalties associated with violating the budget band constraints
(14), production constraints (15) and (16), and the inventory requirement constraints (22).
Each constraint has an associated continuous non-negative elastic variable that takes on
the positive magnitude of violation when the constraint is violated. Penalties are
expressed in (FY99$M) dollars or dollar equivalents so they have meaningful values.
The elastic variables associated with not meeting budget requirements are
OVERTOAy and UNDERTOAy . OVERTOAy expresses the amount by which the upper
budget band is exceeded and UNDERTOAy incurs positive value when the lower budget
band is violated. Both variables incur a penalty of 1 .07 (FY99$M) for each unit of
violation. The Office of Management and Budget [1992] mandates a seven percent
discount rate be used for public investment: "this rate approximates the marginal pretax
rate of return on an average investment in the private sector in recent years." Therefore,
every penalty represents the cost of borrowing money or a foregone investment
opportunity as appropriate in that year.
OVERPRODpy and UNDERPRODpy are the elastic variables associated with the
production constraints. If a facility's production capability is exceeded, OVERPRODpy
expresses the excess; UNDERPRODpy incurs positive value if a facility does not receive
enough work to maintain its workforce. In CIPA production levels are measured by size
of workforce. Each ship requires a facility-specific workforce in a given year of
production. The penalty associated with positive values ofOVERPRODpy equates to
overtime cost or time-and-a-half. Positive values ofUNDERPRODpy imply that a
shipyard is underutilized and may lose critical industrial capabilities; it is more costly,
double time, to violate the minimum production constraints.
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The penalty variable associated with not meeting mission inventory requirements
is DEGRADE™, which expresses the deficiency when the force level does not meet a
minimum requirement. The penalty associated with positive values ofDEGRADEm is
equivalent to the cost associated with procuring one more of the most expensive unit that
performs the degraded mission area. This encourages procurement of units before failing
to meet mission requirements.
When dealing with infeasible planning scenarios — not an infrequent requirement
— elastic penalties offer considerable influence over when the infeasibilities will arise and
how they might be resolved. In this vein, we argue that the discount rate for elastic
penalties reflect the "fog of future planning," and suggest a higher discount than that
justified by just the cost of capital. If we are forced to recommend optimally infeasible
plans, better to arrange for violations to occur as far in the future as possible so that we
have maximum time to prepare for and to treat the consequences.
25
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
CIPA is implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS)
[Brooke et al. 1997] with the CPLEX solver, Version 6.5 [ILOG 1999]. Over a 25-year
planning horizon we use eight mission areas, 1 9 ship classes, five aircraft types, five
production facilities, and three categories of money. The eight mission areas include six
that are surface ship specific, one that is submarine specific, and one that is aircraft
specific. The model has approximately 5,000 equations and 8,100 variables, of which a
little over half are binary.
Like EPA/TOA, the first five years of the 25-year planning horizon are fixed in
CIPA to reflect the Future Years Defense Plan. This provides accurate initial conditions
that reflect the best intentions ofNavy planners. CIPA schedules procurement only if
production can be completed and delivery accepted within the planning horizon.
Therefore, CIPA does not schedule procurement past Fiscal Year 20for ships and Fiscal
Year 23 for aircraft. The resulting end-effects produce far term (FY21-25)
recommendations that diminish to zero procurements. While various methods exist to
adjust or account for these end-effects, we feel this mimics current planning practices that
treat far-term procurements as highly speculative.
CIPA is a mixed-integer linear program, and it is solved by branch-and-bound
enumeration. The relative integer termination tolerance (the difference between the best
integer solution and the best known lower bound, divided by the absolute value of the
best integer solution) can influence the time required to solve each model instance. With
a relative integer tolerance of five percent, CIPA generally runs in less than two minutes
on a personal computer equipped with a Pentium II 333 MHZ processor and 192MB of
ram. For planning purposes, we have used five percent. There is no ambiguity in this
choice when comparing alternatives, as long as the competitors have integrality gaps (the
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interval from the solution value to its lower bound) that are disjoint. Otherwise, a smaller
relative tolerance can be applied with some likely increase in computation effort.
We also remind the reader that this tolerance is likely considerably better than the
fidelity and resolution of the underlying planning data.
B. DATA
The data is presented by category in the same order it is encountered in the model
formulation. Data for model excursions is presented as required later.
1. Ship Procurement Cost
Fixed SCN cost for platforms is taken from EPA/TOA. These non-discretionary
fixed costs include money budgeted for Landing Craft Air Cushion vehicles and Service
Craft procurement (lcacy), first destination transfer cost (xfery), post delivery cost (delivy),
and procurement cost for major platforms not controlled by CIPA (otherCostscN,y). This
data is summarized in Table 1
.
Fiscal Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Icac 35 35 35 35 35
xfer 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
deliv
otherCost 532.7117 634.107 282.2524 516.1959 1660.915 391.8477 754.8223 1623.967 4143.728 6821.949
Fiscal Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Icac 35 35 35 35 35
xfer 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
deliv
otherCost 10839.35 9289.781 10720.75 9961 839 11437.31 8017.665 8911.891 9953.479 7963.321 5307.852
Table 1. Fixed SCN cost data taken from the EPA/TOA model (FY99$M). The data
represents money budgeted over twenty years for Landing Craft Air Cushion and Service
Craft Procurement (Icac), first destination transfer cost (xfer), post delivery cost (deliv),
and procurement cost for decisions not under consideration in CIPA (otherCost).
Piecewise linear approximations of the ship and submarine cost functions in
EPA/TOA, shown in Appendix A, are used for procurement cost data (scostsydt). Figure 6
shows the actual EPA/TOA cost function and its associated linear approximation for
Fiscal Year 2006 Arleigh Burke class (DDG) destroyer procurements. These linear
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approximations of the concave cost functions are tangential so that they overestimate
procurement cost and provide a built in measure of conservatism Some ships, including
the CVX carrier and the Virginia class (SSN774) submarine, require cost saving advance
procurement payments made one or two years before full procurement. Procurement cost
data is summarized in Table 2.
DDG PROCUREMENT COST
EPA/TOA. DDG.





Figure 6. DDG-51 class ship procurement cost function and associated piecewise linear
approximation (FY99SM). The procurement cost for all ships and submarines in CIPA is
generated using tangential piecewise linear approximations of the EPA/TOA cost













DDG 1 1318 1380
DDG 2-3 726 1390 721.2010
DDG 4-6 561 6195 1173.2390
DD21 1-6 785
CVX 1-6 1388.1934 3923.6641
SSN774 1 213.7405 422.3919 1002.5445
SSN774 2 213.7405 422.3919 1940.7257
SSN774 3 213.7405 422.3919 2856.0560
SSN774 4-6 213.7405 422.3919 895.4740 174.9607
LHX 1 2117.0483 2117.0483
LHX 2-6 1272.2643 1272.2646
Table 2. CIPA ship and submarine procurement cost data (FY99$M). Procurement
costs are tangential piecewise linear approximations of the EPA/TOA cost functions;
each purchase quantity range contributes a linear approximation. Advanced procurement
costs are included for the CVX class carrier and SSN774 class submarine. These are paid
one and two years prior to full procurement.
2. Aircraft Procurement Cost
Aircraft procurement cost data is drawn exclusively from the EPA/TOA model.
Fixed APN cost data consist entirely of the procurement cost of aircraft not discretionary
for CIPA. The data is produced by subtracting CIPA-modeled aircraft cost from the total
EPA/TOA aircraft procurement cost for APN categories one through four (APN categories
one through four include money budgeted for procurement of combat, airlift, trainer, and
other aircraft.). This data is presented in Table 3. Categories five through seven are
money budgeted for aircraft modifications, spare and repair parts, and support equipment
and facilities. These categories are estimated by a historic fraction ofAPN categories one
through four in both EPA/TOA and CIPA. In CIPA, the fraction is denoted by APN5 and
is equal to 0.00107.
Fiscal Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
otherCost 4356298 4874.093 5323.416 4721.599 5509.914 6101.367 6001.19 5822.762 5011.796 4305.832
Fiscal Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
otherCost 6011 112 5917.636 6212 508 6455.746 6710.751 5227 712 5942438 6267.949 5695.527 5227.408
Table 3. Fixed APN cost data taken from EPA/TOA (FY99$M) for aircraft not
modeled in CIPA.
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The cost data for CIPA discretionary aircraft, acostaydt, are piecewise linear
approximations of the non-convex aircraft cost functions in EPA/TOA, shown in
Appendix A. For Fiscal Year 2010, Figure 7 shows the actual EPA/TOA cost function
and its associated linear approximation for Navy Variant Joint Strike Fighter (JSFN)
procurements. The first JSFN is scheduled for Fiscal Year 2010 delivery. In CIPA,
procurements of the JSFN in FY08 and FY09, for delivery in FY10 and FY1 1, are
restricted to either 12 or 24 per year to represent opening new production lines. The
associated estimates are taken directly from the EPA/TOA model. JSFN procurements in
FY10 and later are based on a tangential piecewise linear approximation of the EPA/TOA
cost function for FY 10 procurements, which assumes that the Marine Corps and Air Force
purchase 38 and 1 10 Joint Strike Fighters respectively. For Fiscal Years 10 through 25
JSFN procurements have been restricted to the range of 24 to 55. Procurement cost data is
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Figure 7. EPA/TOA procurement cost function for the Navy Variant Joint Strike Fighter
(JSFN) and its associated tangential piecewise linear approximation. By visual
inspection the cost are nearly equal. The maximum overestimate of the FY10


























Table 4. Aircraft procurement cost data for the Navy Variant Joint Strike Fighter
(JSFN) and F18EF fighter (FY99$M). Procurement costs are tangential piecewise linear
approximations of the associated EPA/TOA cost functions. For the F18EF, the above
data is valid for FY06 through FY12: production ceases in FY12. For the first two years
of JSFN procurements, FY08 and FY09, procurements have been limited to 12 and 24 to
account for the new production line. In FY08 the procurement cost are 78.5082 and
72.076 per aircraft for 12 and 24 aircraft respectively. In FY09, the cost is 68.255 and
62.995 per aircraft for 12 and 24 respectively. The table data is valid for FY10 through
FY25 for the JSFN.
3. OMN Cost
OMN cost data is taken from the EPA/TOA model. OMN fixed costs for
platforms not modeled in CIPA are given in Table 5. Aircraft are approximated by a
single cost factor of 0.8679 (FY99$M) per aircraft. For ships and submarines a two-
component piecewise linear approximation is required to provide a closer approximation
ofOMN cost per ship. The components are separated by a single break point; all ships or
submarines below the break point incur a higher cost than do the ships above the
breakpoint. Figure 8 shows the actual EPA/TOA cost function for the SSN774 and its
associated linear approximation. OMN cost data for ships and submarines is shown in
Table 6.
Fiscal Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
otherCost 4839916 4774.401 4765.315 4661.751 4669.371 4537.59 4482.305 4486.096 4489 99 4485 604
Fiscal Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
otherCost 4496.989 4495.705 4506.234 4514.38 4572 837 4852 36 51938 5531.815 5866.621 6247.427
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Figure 8. EPA/TOA OMN cost function for the Virginia class (SSN774) submarine and
its associated tangential piecewise linear approximation. By visual inspection the
function and its approximation look nearly identical. The maximum overestimate of the









FFG 10 26.2000 26.1600
CG 16 53.4039 53.3087
DD 10 26.2625 26.2363
DD21 21 50.2267 50.1089
DDG 16 52.3340 52.2110
SSN774 16 54.6018 54.4080
SSN688 16 52.7135 52.5172
SSN21 3 66.4510 66.4510
CVX 5 526.9090 524.9517
CVN68 5 531.5264 528.7448
CVN63 2 255.3423 255.3423
CVN65 1 326.3699 326.3699
LHX 5 141.4739 141.2174
LHD 5 154.8960 154 5707
LHA 5 132.2465 132.2465
LSD36 1 44.6474 44.6474
LSD41 5 55.0482 54.9722
LPD4 5 42.6987 42.6987
LPD17 5 87.5529 87.4283
Table 6. OMN cost data for CIPA modeled ships and submarines (FY99$M). Costs
are approximated on a two-component, linear piecewise approximation of the EPA/TOA
OMN cost function. Ships and submarines below the break-point have a per unit cost
that is more expensive than those above.
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4. Budget Data
The budget data consist of upper and lower bounds for TOA; where TOA is
defined as the sum of SCN, APN, and OMN monies. The bounds for the base case are
equal to the maximum and minimum TOA observed in EPA/TOA. The upper and lower
bounds are 51,042.6 (FY99$M) and 34,684.6 (FY99$M) respectively. Alternate budget
bounds are explored later.
5. Production Facility Data
For each production facility, minimum and maximum production ranges have
been provided by NAVSEA [Bissell 1999]. Production ranges are given in terms of
employment levels expressed in number of workers. A minimum employment level
represents the number of workers that must be employed to ensure no vital industrial
capability is lost. The maximum employment levels represent the maximum production
capability of the shipyard. The production ranges used are considered business sensitive
proprietary data and are not shown here.
In CIPA, for a given ship type the base case assumes each facility can produce at
most two ships per year. This limits the total number of ships produced per year to four
for ships that are produced at multiple facilities. SSN774 class submarines are co-
produced by Electric Boat and Newport News shipyards and have been limited to a total
production of two per year to reflect initial purchase quantities. This restriction is relaxed
in subsequent model excursions.
Employment requirements for each ship type, provided by NAVSEA [Alberts
1999], are facility specific and defined in terms of the average workers per year; each
year of construction has unique employment requirements. Data for the LHX and CVX
is not available, so it is approximated using the employment requirement for the LHD
and CVN77 class ships. Again, the actual data is business sensitive, but a fabricated
example is provided in Table 7 for illustrative purposes.
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INGALS DDG PRODUCTION
Year of Production 1ST 2ND 3RD 4TH 5TH
Average Workers Per Year 90 100 500 1000 400
Table 7. Production facility ship construction employment data. This fabricated
example is provided for illustrative purposes because the actual data is business sensitive.
Employment requirements by facility and ship type, similar in structure to this example,
are used to calculate the production levels at each facility. In this example, if Ingals is
building two DDGs, one in its second year of construction and one in its fourth year of
construction, then its employment level is 1 100.
6. Retirement Data
CIPA cumulative retirement goals are taken directly from EPA/TOA. The
cumulative goals permit early retirement if it is beneficial. CIPA assumes that a retired
platform is included in its platform inventory and incurs OMN cost in the year it is
retired. Platform retirement goals are listed by year and type in Appendix B. For
example, the entire inventory ofDD class ships and F14 aircraft must be retired by FY1
1
and FY08 respectively. Specific retirement goals for each year until retirement are
shown in Table 8 for the DD and F14.
CUMULATIVE RETIREMENT GOALS
PLATFORM FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12
DD 3 6 9 13 16 19 19
F14 13 38 74 74 74 74 74
Table 8. Cumulative retirement goals for the DD class ship and F14 aircraft taken from
EPA/TOA. The cumulative goals allow CIPA to schedule early retirements if it is
beneficial. The entire inventory of DDs and F14s must be retired by FY11 and FY08
respectively. Retirement goals for all CIPA platforms are in Appendix B.
7. Inventory and Mission Data
Initial platform inventory levels, taken from EPA/TOA, are the planned
inventories at the end of Fiscal Year 2005 and can be found in Appendix B.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) [Department of Defense 1997] specifies
a force level of 1 1 6 surface combatants, which includes FFG, DDG, DD, and CG class
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ships. In CIPA, the surface ship combatant mission has been divided into the two
missions of combatant-escort and combatant-cruiser: FFG, DDG, DD21, and DD class
ships perform the combatant-escort mission and the CG class ship performs combatant-
cruiser mission. While all the ships in the combatant-escort mission do not have the same
capabilities, they do perform many of the same functions in a battle group. Additionally,
the next generation of surface combatant, DD2 1 , is being built to replace the FFG and
DD ships. These divisions may oversimplify the battle group structure, but they prove
adequate to provide insight into force levels. The CG class ship is given its own mission
because of its unique air-warfare command capabilities. The mission requirement for the
combatant-cruiser has been set to 27, which is the current inventory ofCG class ships.
The mission requirement for combatant-escort is 89: the QDR specifies 116 surface
combatant requirement minus the combatant-cruiser requirement of 27.
The QDR requirement for Amphibious Ready Groups is 1 2 [Department of
Defense 1997]. A typical Amphibious Ready Group consists of one assault ship; LHA,
LHD, or LHX class ship; one LPD class ship, and one LSD class ship. In CIPA, the
amphibious sea-lift mission is divided into three categories to mirror the Amphibious
Ready Group composition. The missions are amphibious-assault, performed by LHD,
LHA and LHX class ships; amphibious-platform; performed by LPD4 and LPD 17 class
ships; and amphibious-dock; performed by LSD36 and LSD41 class ships. Each mission
requires 12 ships to meet the QDR requirements.
For submarines, the one CIPA mission is attack and corresponds directly with the
QDR-specified 50 attack submarine requirement [Department of Defense 1997].
SSN774, SSN688, and SSN21 class submarines perform the attack mission.
The F14, F18AB, F18CD, F18EF, and JSFN aircraft perform the CIPA mission of
fighter. According to the Director Air Warfare [1999], the typical Carrier Air Wing
Tactical Air compliment is 14 F14 aircraft and 36 Fl 8 aircraft. With the retirement of the
F14 and the introduction of the JSFN, the vision for the Carrier Air Wing Tactical Air
compliment for 2010 and beyond is an unidentified mix of 50 F18 and JSFN aircraft.
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Total Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) inventory requirements or goals are not available
because planning is conducted based on squadron level inventories and allowances
[Drohr 1999]. To facilitate force level planning, CIPA fighter requirements are generated
using squadron level planning factors applied at the force level. The number of Primary
Mission Authorized Aircraft (PMAA) is the base number used at the squadron level for
determining aircraft requirements. Primary Training Aircraft Authorized (PTAA) is the
number of aircraft authorized for training. The number of aircraft identified for
development and testing is the Primary Development and Test Aircraft Authorized
(PDAA). The formulas used to determine the number of Primary Aircraft Authorized
(PAA) are as follows:
PAA = PMAA + PTAA + PDAA
Where:
PTAA = 0.25*PMAA and
PDAA = 0.07*PMAA.
Pipeline or maintenance requirements must also be accounted for when determining the
total number of required aircraft. A pipeline-planning factor of 1.12 is used. The QDR
specifies 10 active air wings and one reserve air wing. As noted earlier the future carrier
air wing will consist of 50 TACAIR. The CIPA TACAIR requirement is 550 aircraft if
maintenance, training, and development are ignored. PAA equals 726 aircraft if we
assume PMAA is 550. Applying the pipeline-planning factor to PAA yields a total
requirement of 814 tactical aircraft.
C. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
1. Baseline Case
The baseline case is presented to provide a benchmark and direction for later
excursions. All money is in Fiscal Year 99 million dollars.
Analysis of mission inventory levels for the baseline case reveals all mission
requirements are satisfied except the combatant-cruiser and the attack submarine
missions. Failure to meet combatant-cruiser mission requirements was anticipated and
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can be attributed to the absence of a CIPA-modeled replacement platform for the CG
class ship. Inventory levels fall below mission requirements starting in Fiscal Year 21,
which is far enough in the future that adjustments can be made to correct this deficiency
The combatant-cruiser mission level is a known deficiency for the remainder of this
analysis. Combatant-cruiser mission levels are shown in Figure 9.
Investigation of the attack inventory level deficiencies reveals that SSN774
production can not keep pace with retirement goals. This is because the dual-yard
construction of SSN774 class ships limits production to two submarines per year. Attack
mission inventory levels are shown in Figure 10. Relaxation of constraint (16), which
schedules parallel and synchronous construction for SSN774 class submarines between
Electric Boat and Newport News shipyards, is investigated in the next model excursion to
allow production of four SSN774 class submarines per year.
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Figure 9. Combatant-cruiser mission inventory levels. Mission level deficencies, which
begin in FY21, are anticipated and can be attributed to the absence of a CEPA-modeled
replacement platform for the CG class ship. The combatant-cruiser mission level
deficency is treated as a known problem for the remainder of this analysis.
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Figure 10. Baseline attack mission inventory levels. Beginning in FY15 the inventory
level falls below the minimum requirement of 50 attack submarines. Production rates can
not keep pace with retirement goals. Dual shipyard construction of the SSN774 class
submarine is limited to two submarines per year. Subsequent model excursions allow a
production rate of four SSN774 submarines per year.
CIPA recommends a budget that exceeds the baseline budget band in Fiscal Years
13, 17, 18, and 19. Investigation of Figure 1 1 reveals that these over-expenditures can be
compensated for by lower spending rates in earlier and subsequent years. Additionally,
the over-expenditure is far enough in the future to permit appropriate remedies.
CIPA schedules production only if it will be completed in Fiscal Year 25 or
earlier. This end-effect assumption limits the construction that can be scheduled during
the last years of the planning horizon. Production facility penalties for insufficient
employment levels are incurred only in the first and last years of the planning horizon.
Initial conditions force the former, and end-effects the latter.
CIPA recommends exceeding production capabilities at Bath, Ingals, and
Newport News shipyards. Excess production at Bath occurs in FY10, but is likely within
its surge capability. Excess production for Ingals and Newport News occur in FY17 and
FY15 respectively. For Ingals, the excess production would require increasing the
maximum employment level 12 percent. The maximum employment level at Newport
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News would require a five percent increase. Production capability violations are large
enough that they warrant further investigation but are far enough in the future that they
can likely be reconciled.
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Figure 11. Total Obligated Authority cost for the baseline case (FY99$M). The CIPA
budget recommends small over-expenditures in FY13, FY17, FY18, and FY19. For this
case the budget band violations occur far enough in the future that they can be
compensated for with under-expenditures in preceeding years. The FY20 through FY25
budgets demonstrate end-effects. CEPA schedules production only if it will be completed
in FY25 or earlier. This limits construction and procurement in the last years of the
planning horizon.
2. Excursion One - Increased SSN774 Production
The attack mission deficiency in the baseline case highlights the need for
increased production of the SSN774 class submarine. Constraint (16) is relaxed to allow
independent construction of SSN774 class submarines at Electric Boat and Newport
News shipyards, which increases maximum yearly production from two to four.
Increased production corrects the attack mission deficiency. However, it also curiously
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recommends retiring all SSN21 class submarines by Fiscal Year 12. This can be
attributed to the higher OMN cost of the SSN21 class submarine: each SSN21 class
submarine costs approximately 12 million dollars more per year than the SSN774 class
submarine. While the retirement of the SSN21 class submarine makes financial sense, it
is too valuable to retire early. The retirements of the SSN21 submarine will be restricted
in the next excursion to provide a more palatable recommendation. Figure 12 shows the
composition of the attack mission inventory.
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Figure 12. Attack Mission Inventory for Excursion One: Increased SSN774 Production.
Increased production capacity for the SSN774 class submarine corrects the attack mission
deficiency. However, it recommends retiring all SSN21 submarines early because of the
higher OMN cost associated with the SSN21 class submarine in comparison to the
SSN774 class submarine. While this may save money, it is not likely planners will allow
early retirement of the SSN21 class submarine.
3. Excursion Two - Controlled SSN21 Retirements
The previous excursion identified the need to restrict SSN21 class submarine
retirements to provide a more realistic force structure plan. For this excursion, the
increased SSN774 production capabilities are retained and SSN21 class submarine
retirements are not permitted in the planning horizon. As in the previous excursion, all
mission inventory requirements, with the exception of the combatant-cruiser mission, are
satisfied. Additionally, the recommended force structure plan makes sense. The CIPA
generated force structure plan for excursion two is presented in Appendix C. Figure 13
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presents the attack mission inventory associated with excursion two for comparison with
excursion one.
CIPA recommends a budget that exceeds the upper budget band in Fiscal Years
16 and 18. The total amount of recommended over-expenditures is less for excursion two
than the baseline case. As expected, the total amount expended over the entire planning
horizon is greater for excursion two than the baseline because more SSN774's are
produced. Figure 14 shows the TOA levels associated with excursion two and the
baseline case.
Newport News Shipbuilding is the only shipyard required to exceed maximum
employment levels for the recommended production plan. At approximately two percent,
this is trivial. As in the baseline case, excursion two recommends employment levels
below the required minimum in the first and last years of the planning horizon.
Additionally, CEPA recommends employment levels below the required minimum in
Fiscal Years 19 and 21 for Ingals shipyard. The theoretical layoffs associated with the
recommended plan for Ingals are large enough to invite further investigation, but they are
far in the future.
Attack Mission Inventory - Excursion Two
(Controlled SSN21 Retirements)











Figure 13. Attack Mission Inventory for Excursion Two: Controlled SSN21
Retirements. The attack mission inventory requirement of 50 attack submarines is
satisfied by the CIPA recommended force structure plan.
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Figure 14. Total Obligated Authority for Excursion Two: Controlled SSN21 Retirements.
In excursion two SSN774 production is increased to four per year and SSN21 retirements
are controlled to eliminate unrealistic retirements. The graph shows that the total over-
expenditures recommended in the baseline case exceed those of excursion two.
However, as expected, increased production of SSN774 class submarines results in
higher total expenditures over the entire planning horizon. The FY20 through FY25
budgets demonstrate end-effects. CIPA schedules production only if it will be completed
in FY25 or earlier. This limits construction and procurment in the last years of the
planning horizon.
4. Excursion Three - Reduced Budget Band
The budget band used in the previous CIPA model excursions is set to the
maximum and minimum values observed in EPA/TOA over the 25-year planning
horizon. This budget band may be too liberal. In excursion 3, the budget bands are
reduced to plus or minus ten percent of the average TOA observed in EPA/TOA. The
new upper and lower budget bands are 46,803 and 38,293 million dollars respectively.
This lowers the upper band by 4,239 million and raises the lower bound by 3,608 million.
Reducing the budget band produces the first mission inventory deficiency not
associated with production or platform replacement limitations. In Fiscal Year 20, the
combatant-escort mission area has a deficiency of one ship. This deficiency occurs far in
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the future, and can be offset by something as simple as delaying a planned retirement just
one year. The combatant-escort mission inventory levels are shown in Figure 15
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Figure 15. Combatant-escort Mission Inventory for Excursion Three: Reduced Budget
Band. For excursion three the budget band is decreased by over 7000 million dollars
from the previous budget band. The new budget band results in a combatant-escort
mission deficency of one ship in Fiscal Year 20. This deficiency is easily dealt with by
delaying a planned retirement.
Over-expenditures are required for multiple years in the CIPA-recommended
budget for excursion three. Although excursion three violates its upper budget band more
frequently and in larger quantities than excursion two, its total expenditures are far less
than those of excursion two. This is accomplished with no appreciable loss in mission
inventory levels, but with erratic production schedules that violate the minimum
employment levels more frequently than excursion two. However, violations occur far
enough in the future that they are most likely a function of CIPA's terminal production
assumptions and can be corrected in future planning scenarios. Figure 16 shows the
recommended budget levels for excursion two and three.
This is another scenario where CEPA over-expenditures can be balanced by lower
spending in earlier and in subsequent years; however, this is fortuitous We can
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formalize the idea keeping track of cumulative over and/or under-expenditures by
modifying constraint (13) as follows.
X tpa y , < XZ BUDGET^ < £ toa,
y<y c /<y ysy
Vy (13a).
With this modification, any over- or under-expenditure is penalized in the year it occurs,
and is carried forward and perhaps penalized in subsequent years as well. However,
CIPA can avoid paying more penalties by finding funding patterns that balance
cumulative over and/or under-expenditure as quickly as possible.
Repeating this excursion with the cumulative budget modification (13a), there are
more over-expenditures year-by-year, but only one of these is a cumulative over-
expenditure: 298 million in Fiscal Year 20.
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Figure 16. Total Obligated Authority for Excursion Three: Reduced Budget Band. For
excursion three the budget band is reduced by over 7000 million dollars. The reduction
in total expenditures for excursion three, when compared to excursion two, is
accomplished with no loss in mission effectiveness. The cost savings result in erratic
production schedules that violate production requirements more frequently than previous
excursions. Production violations occur far enough in the future that they are most likely
due to CIPA's terminal production assumptions and can be corrected in the future The
FY20 through FY25 budgets demonstrate end-effects. CIPA schedules production only if
it will be completed in FY25 or earlier. This limits construction and procurement in the
last years of the planning horizon.
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5. Excursion Four - Increased Attack Mission Requirements
The 50 attack submarine QDR requirement has put serious strains on the attack
submarine force. Analysts with the Force Structure IWARS component are unofficially
evaluating a 55 submarine attack inventory requirement [Ruck 1 999]. For excursion four
the attack mission inventory requirement in CIPA is changed to 55 and evaluated within
the restricted budget bands from excursion three.
Attack mission inventory level deficiencies, shown in Figure 17, occur from
Fiscal Year 06 through Fiscal Year 12. Deficiencies are attributed to fixed production
associated with the Fiscal Year Defense Plan procurements that dominate the initial
planning years.
The requirement for an additional five submarines increases the total expenditures
over the planning horizon, but does not significantly change the amount of over-
expenditures. TOA levels are shown in Figure 18 for excursions three and four.
Production schedules improve for all shipyards for excursion four. The maximum
employment levels are never violated and the minimum production levels are violated
less than in the previous excursion.
A 5 5-submarine attack force is definitely attainable within the projected budget
band. However, to attain the required 55 attack submarine level in the near term would
require reevaluating retirements and procurements for the Fiscal Year Defense Plan
period.
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Attack Mission Inventory - Excursion 4
(Increased Attack Mission Requirements)











Figure 17. Attack Mission Inventory for Excursion Four: Increased Attack Mission
Requirements. The mission inventory requirement for attack submarines is increased
from 50 to 55 in excursion four and evaluated using the same budget bands as in
excursion three. Mission level deficiencies occur in FY06 through FY 12. The
deficiencies are attributed to the fixed procurements associated with the Fiscal Years
Defense Plan in the early years. Attack submarine retirements and procurements in the
Fiscal Years Defense Plan period require reevaluation to attain the new inventory level in
the near term.
TOA Excursion 4
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Figure 18. Total Obligated Authority for Excursion Four: Increased Attack Mission
Level Requirement. Over-expenditures for excursions three and four are nearly identical
As anticipated, the total expenditures for the entire planning horizon increase for
excursion four and production level violations decrease. The FY20 through FY25
budgets demonstrate end-effects. CEPA schedules production only if it will be completed
in FY25 or earlier. This limits construction and procurement in the last years of the
planning horizon.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CIPA augments existing tools by providing a recommended plan that
automatically accounts for the integrated effects of budget constraints, production facility
requirements, production capabilities, and mission inventory requirements. "What-if
'
scenarios generally run in under two minutes. CIPA output is easily explored and, as
Chapter IV demonstrates, when coupled with a spreadsheet for data manipulation, can
illuminate deficiencies resulting from resource conflicts.
CIPA models the majority of high-visibility navy procurement programs as
discretionary and accounts for the other procurement programs by just setting aside these
funds. Expanding CIPA to include all SCN and APN procurements can provide increased
model flexibility and procurement insights.
While model output is easily analyzed with a spreadsheet, model manipulation
requires an intimate knowledge of the General Algebraic Modeling System [Brooke et al.
1997]. A simple interface is required to make the system user friendly for the average
analyst.
Like EPA/TOA, near-term CIPA procurements are fixed to reflect the Fiscal
Years Defense Plan. This complicates analysis of emergent near-term requirements.
Workforce requirements for each ship type, which are facility specific and defined
in terms of the average workers per year, are based on a representative platform. For
example, the respective workforces for a DDG-class ship at Bath or Ingals shipyards are
based on the projected employment requirements for the last ship to be produced at each
facility. So, although production costs do account for learning, workforce levels do not.
Workforce requirements that account for learning effects would be more realistic and
potentially improve CIPA validity.
In CIPA, mission requirements are based solely on inventory levels and do not
account for platforms that cross mission boundaries; for instance helicopters prosecute
enemy submarines, conduct search and rescue missions, and provide surveillance and
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targeting data on enemy surface combatants. Additionally, the mission requirements do
not address the increased mission effectiveness achieved by combining different weapon
platforms. Further research is required to refine inventory levels or mission areas to
account for synergistic weapon effects and platforms that cross mission boundaries.
Despite its limitations, CIPA is the only known navy model that integrates APN
and SCN procurements and provides force structure recommendations based on fiscal,
industrial, and mission requirements. CIPA demonstrates the potential of military capital
budgeting models for use by the Navy. It is the first step towards even smarter Navy
procurement. Given the large amounts of resources, research and technology, and money
involved with procurement ofNavy capital investments, expansion of CIPA to a full-scale
stand-alone model is warranted and highly recommended.
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APPENDIX A. EPA/TOA COST FUNCTIONS
The EPA/TOA model uses a cost estimation relationship for SCN, APN, and
OMN monies. The formulas associated with computing these monies are presented
below.
SCN costs are calculated in EPA/TOA by summing the total procurement cost of
all ships {Totship), total cost of outfitting all ships (Totout), total post delivery cost for all
ships (Totpost), total cost for LCAC and Service Craft (TotLCAC), and total first
destination transfer cost (Totxfer). Totxfer, TotLCAC, and Totpost are fixed by year.
Outfitting cost, represented by Totout, is calculated by multiplying Totship by the scalar
frac. For Fiscal Year 2006 (FY06) the formula (including some zeros applicable for this
year) is:
SCN = Totship + Totout + Totpost + TotLCAC + Totxfer.
Where:




Totpost = Post96/SCN96 * Totship = 0* Totship, and
Totout = Out96 1 SCN96 * Totship = 0. 0289 * Totship.
The primary cost driver for SCN is Totship cost. The procurement cost (Totcost)
for a specific ship type captures savings realized from workforce learning and increased








Qty = number ships purchased,
Tlcost = theoretical cost of first ship = 1.518,
Islope = learning slope = 0.984,
rslope = rate slope = 0.787,
midpt = (cqFY05 + 1 + cqFY06 + (2 * y](cqFYOS + 1) *cqFY06 ) ) / 4 ,
cqFY05 = cum total quantity DDGs in FY05, and
cqFY06 = cum total quantity DDGs in FY06 .
APN money is comprised of seven categories. Categories 1 through 4 (APN4)
include procurement cost for combat, airlift, trainer, and other aircraft. Categories 5
through 7 (APN5, APN6, APN7) include cost for aircraft modifications, spare and repair
parts, and support equipment. Total cost (APN) are calculated by summing all APN
categories. The formulas are:
APN = APN4 + APN5 + APN6 + APN7
Where:
APN4 = Yjotcost^, with type={F18EF, JSFN, F14, ...},
type




The primary cost driver for APN is Totcosttype . The procurement cost {Totcost)
for a specific aircraft type captures savings realized from workforce learning and
increased purchase rates. Air Force and the Marine Corps JSF procurement rates effect
the Navy's Totcostjsfn and are assumed to be 110 (JSFAF) and 38 (JSFMC) per year





TIcost* midpt z *Qty L
Where:
Qty = number aircraft purchased,
priors = base (prior) production for the cost formula = 1 2,
TIcost = theoretical cost of first aircraft = 280.615,
Islope = learning slope = 0.857,
rslope = rate slope = 0.929,
comAF = commonality of Airforce and Navy JSF = 0.95,
comMC = commonality of Marine Corps and Navy JSF = 0.80,
midpt = (cqFY09 + 1 + cqFYlO + (2 * j(cqFY09 + 1) * cqFYlO ) )/4 ,
cqFY09 = 228.8 = cum total quantity JSFs in FY09, and
cqFYlO = Oty + (comAF*JSFAF + comMC*JSFMC) = Qty + 133.3
= cum total quantity JSFNs in FY10 .
OMN costs are estimated based on the number of navy civilian employees
(estCiv), total ship tons (shipTon), and total ship electrical generation capacity (shipGeri).
The formulas are:
[(0.0 1 3 74 * estCiv
02™ * shipTon m94 * shipGen05361 ) / 0.8528] - 0.0 1 232
Where:
OtherShipTon = Total of all other ship tons,
OtherShipGen = Total of all other ship electrical generation capacities,
DONPAA = Number of Primary Aircraft Authorized for the Navy = 3704,
shipTon = OtherShipTon + tons*Qty,
shipGen = OtherShipGen + kw*Qty, and
estCiv = 0.00171 * DONPAA05m * shipTon "941 .
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APPENDIX B. PLATFORM RETIREMENT REQUIREMENTS
CIPA cumulative retirement goals are taken directly from EPA/TOA. The
cumulative goals permit early retirement if it is beneficial. CIPA assumes that a retired


































































DD 3 6 9 13 16 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
FFG 2 2 2 2 5 8 11 14 16 18 21 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
CG 1 4 7 10 13 16
SSN774
SSN21
SSN688 1 2 2 3 4 6 9 12 15 17 20 22 25 27 30 33 36 39 42
CVX
CV63 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
CVN65 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CVN68 1 1 1
LHX
LHD
LHA 1 1 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
LSD36 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LSD41 1
LPD17
LPD4 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
JSFN
F18AB 16 16 19 29 35 40 56 99 135 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
F18CD 17 37 56 75 111 143 164 182 219 270 319 364 415 457 458 467 467 467 467 467
F18EF 6 12 19 25 30 36 42 48 61 79 104 131 163
F14 13 38 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74
Table 9. Platform retirement requirements taken form EPA/TOA. Specifying
cumulative retirement goals allows CIPA to recommend early retirements if it is
beneficial.
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APPENDIX C. CIPA FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN
CIPA recommendations are output to a comma-delimited text file and can easily
be imported into a spreadsheet. In excursion two, SSN774 production is increased from
two to four per year and SSN21 retirements are controlled to eliminate unrealistic
retirements. The recommended CIPA force structure plan details mission and platform
inventory levels, procurements, and retirements.
CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
SHIP AND SUBMARINE INVENTORY
Mission Platform FY06 FY07 FY08 c Y0S FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FV14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY 19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FV24 FY25
combat DDG 49 49 53 53 53 54 56 56 56 56 56 54 52 52 52 50 50 50 44 40
combat DD21 1 4 8 12 14 17 19 21 23 27 31 35 37 39 39 41 45 49
combat FFG 24 24 24 22 22 22 19 16 14 •2 10 8 6 2 C
combat DD 19 16 11 10 6 3
combat Mission 92 89 89 89 89 91 89 89 89 S9 89 39 89 89 89 89 89 91 89 89
combat-CG CG 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 23 20 17 14
combat-CG Mission 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 23 20 17 14
earner cv> 2 2 4 5 5 6 7 7 8 9 9 9 9 10 11
earner CVN68 9 9 10 10 10 9 9 8.77 8.77 8.77 5 434 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 1
earner CVN63 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
came- CVN65 1 1 1 1 1
earner Mission 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 13.77 14.77 14.77 12 12.34 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
artack- SSN774 2 3 4 4 5 6 8 10 12 15 17 20 22 24 27 31 23 35 38 41
artack- SSN688 45 44 43 43 42 41 39 37 35 32 30 28 25 23 20 16 14 12 9 6
attack- SSN21 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
attack- Mission 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 51 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
amphibH LHX 1 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
amphibH LHA 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 1 1 1 1
amphibH LHD 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
amphibH Mission 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
amphibS LSD36 1
amonibS LSD41 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
amDhibS Mission 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
amph'DP LPD4 5 3 1
ameiroP LPD17 7 9 11 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
amohibP Mission 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 "2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Table 10. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Ship and Submarine Inventory. For example, in
FY06 there are 45 SSN688 class submarines to perform the attack mission.
CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY
Mission Platform FY06 FY07 -Y08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 F'i 14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 c i22 FY23 FY24 FY25
tighter JSFN 24 24 78 133 188 243 2 98 304 334 334 334 3;- 356 375 399 425
tighter F18EF 266 314 369 424 479 519 519 513 513 506 500 494 471 471 471 471 458 440 415 388
fighter F18AB 184 165 165 165 149 149 144 95 49 49
fighter F18CD 467 335 280 225 225 122 73 73 73 16 16 16 9 9 9 9
fighter F14 74
fighter Mission 991 814 814 814 877 814 814 814 323 814 814 814 814 814 814 814 314 315 814 3'. 4
Table 11. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Aircraft Inventory,
recommended Navy JSFN inventory is 78 in FY12.
For example, the CIPA
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CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
Combatant: Procurements, Retirements, and Deliveries
Platform Facility action FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
'ddg Bath procure 1 2
DOG inqals procure c
DDG total procure 1 2
DDG 3ath deliver 1 1 2 1 2
DDG inoals deliver 2 1 2 1
DDG tota: deliver 3 2 4 1 1 2
DDG retire rehre 2 1 2 2 2 6 4
DD21 Batn procure 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DD21 Inqals procure 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
DD21 total procure 4 4 2 3 : 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 c
3021 Bath deliver 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DD2I meals deliver 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
D021 totai aenver 1 3 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4
DD21 retire retire
FFG retire retire 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2
DD retire retire 3 5 1 4 3 3
CG retire retire 0| 1 3 3 3 3 3
Table 12. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Combatant Procurements and Retirements. For
example, in FY06 CIPA recommends procuring two DD21 ships for production at Bath
and two for production at Ingals: total DD21 procurement is four. CIPA recommends no
DD21 retirements in FY06.
CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
Amphib: Procurements, Retirements, and Deliveries
Platform Faality action FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
LHX total procure 1 2 2 1 1 2
LHX meals deliver 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
LHX totai deliver 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
LHX retire retire 1 2
LPD17 Avon procure
LPD17 total procure
LPD17 Avon deliver 2 2 2 1 c
LPD17 total deliver 2 2 2 1
LPD17 retire retire
LHA retire retire 1 1 2 1
LHD retire retire 1 1 1
LSD36 retire retire 1
LSD41 retire retire 1
LPD4 retire rebre 2 2 1
Table 13. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Amphibious Procurements and Retirements. For
example, in FY06 CIPA recommends procuring one LHX for production at Ingals. No
LHXs are to be delivered or retired in FY06.
58
CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
Aircraft: Procurements, Retirements, and Deliveries
Platform Facility action FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY-3 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
SSN774 News procure 1| 1 1 2 2 2 2
SSN774 lEDoat procure 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SSN774 f'otai procure 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
SSN774 News deliver 1 1 C 1 1 1 2 2 o| 2 2
SSN774 Eboat deliver 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
SSN774 total deliver 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
SSN774 retire retire 1 1 1
SSN688 retire retire 11 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 3 3
SSN21 retire retire 0|
Table 14. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Submarine Procurements and Retirements. For
example, in FY06 CIPA recommends procuring two SSN774 submarines for production
at Electric Boat. No SSN774 submarines are to be delivered or retired in FY06.
CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
Carrier: Procurements, Retirements, and Deliveries
Platform Facility action FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
cvx News procure 2 1 2 1 1 1 1
cvx total orocure 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
CVX News deliver 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
CVX total deliver 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
cvx retire retire 1
CVN68 News deliver 1 o
CVN68 retire retire c 1 023 3 77I 0.66 34 1 1 1
CVN63 retire retire 0| 1 1
CVN65 retire retire 0| 1 o|
Table 15. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Carrier Procurements and Retirements. For
example, CIPA recommends procuring two CVX carriers in FY06. No CVX carriers are
delivered or retired in FY06. CVN68 retirements are fractional and exhibit a curious
jump in FY15. This jump turns out to be because FY 16 is the first year available budget
is exceeded, and CIPA retires CVN68-class carriers in FY 15 to minimize over-
expenditures and still meet mission requirements. If the fractional retirements prove
nettlesome, CIPA inventory variables can be restricted to integer values. Regardless, this
curiosity bears close review.
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CIPA Force Structure Plan - Excursion Two (Controlled SSN21 Retirements)
Aircraft: Procurements, Retirements, and Deliveries
Platform Facility action FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24 FY25
JSFN procure procure 24 54 55 55 55 55 24.54 30 30 24 24 27
JSFN retire retire 18.54 8 5
F18EF procure procure 48 48 55 55 55 40
F18EF retire retire 6 7 6 6 23 c 13 18 25 27 32
F18AB procure procure
F18AB retire retire 19 16 5 49 46 49
F18CD procure procure
F18CD retire retire 132 55 55 103 49 57 7 9
F14 procure procure
F14 retire retire 74
Table 16. CIPA Force Structure Plan: Aircraft Procurements and Retirements. For
example, CIPA recommends procuring 24 JSFN aircraft in FY10. The fractional
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